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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court established in Roe v.
Wade that a woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy is a funda-
mental right under the U.S. Constitution.1  Three years after Roe, the
Court held that this right is not limited to those who have reached the
age of majority, but it also applies to a pregnant minor’s right to an
abortion.2  While states have some leeway to encourage parental in-
volvement in a minor’s abortion decision, the Court held that minors
cannot be denied abortions as a class, and “the State does not have the
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to
terminate the patient’s pregnancy.”3  As such, most states have
passed laws requiring some degree of parental involvement in a mi-
nor’s abortion decision, such as parental notification or consent re-
quirements coupled with a judicial bypass option in which the minor
can seek separate authorization for the procedure from a court.4
State laws requiring parental consent or notification for underage
abortion pose a unique set of problems for girls in foster care.5  For
state wards, legal guardianship rests with the state—not the foster
parents, biological parents, or former legal guardian.6  “Generally
speaking, the [child welfare] agency has the primary legal authority
over the child, the foster parents have custodial rights, and the biolog-
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
3. Id.; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
4. Amy T. Pedagno, Who Are the Parents? In Loco Parentis, Parens Patriae, and
Abortion Decision-Making for Pregnant Girls in Foster Care, 10 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 171, 173 (2011); see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Roe’s Effects on Family Law,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1345–46 nn.20–22 (2014) (providing a comprehen-
sive list of state statutes requiring parental consent, parental notification, or
both); GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION
LAWS (Feb. 1, 2016) [hereinafter STATE POLICIES], archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/T5X8-632N (providing an overview of state policies).
5. Throughout this Note, “foster care” is used to describe any placement for youth
who are “wards of the state.”  Federal law defines foster care as:
24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or
guardians and for whom the [state] agency has placement and care re-
sponsibility.  This includes, but is not limited to, placements in foster
family homes, foster homes of relatives, group homes, emergency shel-
ters, residential facilities, child care institutions, and preadoptive
homes.
45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2012).
6. Katherine Moore, Pregnant in Foster Care: Prenatal Care, Abortion, and the Con-
sequences for Foster Families, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 32 (2012).
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ical parents retain ‘residual parental rights.’”7  To further complicate
matters, child welfare agencies in most states are unable or unwilling
to consent to abortions for foster youth because of federal regulations.8
Many states have failed to consider this complexity, resulting in con-
fusion as to who must be notified or who may consent to the abortion
procedure for state wards.9  While the judicial bypass option would
appear to provide some recourse for pregnant state wards who are un-
able to obtain parental consent for abortion, a closer look reveals that
the process is incredibly difficult and burdensome.
In re Anonymous 510 illustrates the insurmountable difficulty fac-
ing state wards in Nebraska who seek an abortion.  The Nebraska Su-
preme Court upheld a district court decision that denied a state ward’s
request for judicial authorization to terminate her pregnancy, reason-
ing that she was not sufficiently mature and well-informed to make
the decision on her own.11  The court also found the minor failed to
establish that she met any of the exceptions to the parental consent
law, including an exception for victims of abuse or neglect.12  The deci-
sion sparked outrage on a national scale from reproductive rights
groups and child welfare advocates and brought into question the con-
stitutional soundness of Nebraska’s parental consent law as applied to
pregnant girls in foster care.13
This Note argues that Nebraska’s parental consent law and judi-
cial bypass mechanism fails to provide an effective avenue of relief for
an entire class of vulnerable people who need it most.  Moreover, this
7. Id. (quoting HARVEY SCHWEITZER & JUDITH LARSEN, FOSTER CARE LAW: A PRIMER
4 (2005)).
8. See Rachel Rebouche´, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 175, 195 & n.161 (2011); see also infra section II.B (discussing
various obstacles facing state wards seeking an abortion).
9. Moore, supra note 6, at 43.
10. 286 Neb. 640, 838 N.W.2d 226 (2013) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 643, 838 N.W.2d at 230.
12. Id.
13. See Sydney Lupkin, Court Says Nebraska Teenager Too Immature to Decide on
Abortion, ABCNEWS (Oct. 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/court-nebraska-
teenager-immature-decide-abortion/story?id=20507284, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/K4SY-CL6Y; George Chidi, Nebraska Supreme Court Rules 16-Year-Old
‘Not Mature Enough’ for Abortion, RAWSTORY (Oct. 5, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://
www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/10/nebraska/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/85F3-
ZHP4; Martha Stoddard, Nebraska Supreme Court Rejects Foster Child’s Abor-
tion Request, OMAHA.COM (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.omaha.com/news/
nebraska-supreme-court-rejects-foster-child-s-abortion-request/article_93dd28
d0-0647-5f93-8ac0-fd388a5ddc8e.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DN2B-
8KDM; Jessica Mason Pieklo, In Denying a 16-Year-Old Judicial Bypass, Ne-
braska Supreme Court Creates Ban on Abortions for Minors in State Custody, RH
REALITY CHECK (Oct. 6, 2013, 9:18 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/10/
06/in-denying-a-16-year-old-judicial-bypass-nebraska-supreme-court-creates-
ban-on-abortions-for-minors-in-state-custody/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
CB7A-MWLT.
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Note contends that Nebraska’s parental consent law impermissibly
grants judges an absolute veto over a state ward’s access to abortion,
and the judicial bypass procedure imposes an undue burden on state
wards who wish to terminate their pregnancies.  Part II explains the
history and purpose of parental consent laws, as well as their unique
complications when applied to pregnant minors in foster care.  Sec-
tions III.A and III.B examine the specific constitutional issues raised
in light of the court’s holding in Anonymous 5, and section III.C pro-
poses some potential solutions.
While this Note argues in favor of the constitutional protections
guaranteed to pregnant minors, it also recognizes the contentious and
sensitive nature of the subject of abortion in our nation.  The U.S. Su-
preme Court has not been blind to this reality.  In Roe v. Wade, the
Court eloquently recognized “the deep and seemingly absolute convic-
tions that the subject inspires”14 when it stated:
One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human
existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and
their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe,
are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about
abortion.15
Nonetheless, as the Court emphasized in Roe, the issue is one of fun-
damental importance affecting individual rights.  Therefore, it must
be resolved “by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection.”16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Parental Consent Laws for Minors Seeking Abortions
Parental consent laws are rooted in the long-established notion of
parental rights.  Courts have traditionally been “hesitant to delve into
internal family matters,” viewing the family as a “haven, worthy of its
own privacy and autonomy.”17  A series of twentieth-century U.S. Su-
preme Court cases reinforced the idea that parents should be afforded
a great deal of respect for parental and child-rearing decisions without
interference from the states.18  Additionally, the Court has recognized
a state interest in protecting the health and well-being of minors by
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 185.
18. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
an Oregon law that required parents of children between ages eight and sixteen
to send their children to public school was unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (overturning the convictions of three Amish parents under a
compulsory education law when they refused to send their fourteen- and fifteen-
year-old eighth-grade graduated children to school); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (reversing a federal district court ruling that parents could not commit
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encouraging conversation between parents and adolescents about
pregnancy and reproductive options.19
As a result of this underlying respect for parental decision-making,
as well as recognition of the pregnant adolescent’s need for guidance, a
majority of states have passed laws mandating parental involvement
in a pregnant minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.20  Many
states require that a physician obtain the consent of at least one par-
ent or guardian before performing an abortion on a pregnant woman
under the age of eighteen.21  Other states have passed laws requiring
only parental notification, or some combination of consent and
notification.22
While the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld parental consent and
notification laws, it has held that a parent may not be given an abso-
lute veto over a minor’s right to abortion.23  The Court in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth held that because abortion
is a fundamental right that is constitutionally guaranteed,24 “a State
does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an ab-
solute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of a physician
and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding the consent.”25
Three years after Danforth, the Court decided Bellotti v. Baird.26
Bellotti struck down a Massachusetts parental consent law, which
provided that an abortion could be obtained by a court order upon a
showing of good cause so long as both parents were given the opportu-
nity to consent first.27  The Court phrased the issue as “whether [the
statute] . . . provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that
does not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion.”28  As Justice
Powell’s plurality opinion explained, the problem with the statute was
that it required minors to notify their parents in all cases, without
providing an exception for instances in which it would be in the mi-
nor’s best interest that one or both of her parents not be informed.29
their children to state mental-health facilities for treatment without an adver-
sarial hearing before a formal tribunal).
19. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 176.
20. See supra note 4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
24. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (invalidating a state law requiring spousal consent for
married women and parental consent for minors).
26. 443 U.S. 622.
27. Id. at 651.
28. Id. at 640.
29. Id. at 647 (“We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as that un-
dertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity—if she so
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For instance, if the minor has been subjected to abuse or threats from
one or both of her parents, it may be against her best interests to in-
volve her parents in her abortion decision.30  Indeed, it is widely rec-
ognized that respect for parental autonomy does not preclude
interference when parents attempt to use that autonomy as a “shield
to hide” abuse or neglect.31
Bellotti provided much needed guidance to states on how to satisfy
the Danforth requirements in parental consent laws.  After Bellotti,
states were required to provide an “alternative procedure whereby au-
thorization for the abortion can be obtained” in the event a minor
wished not to involve her parents or guardians in her decision to ob-
tain an abortion.32  Thus, the Court stated:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she
is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in
consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2)
that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired
abortion would be in her best interests.33
Since Bellotti, most states have satisfied this requirement by pro-
viding a judicial bypass option in such cases where a pregnant minor
is unable or unwilling to notify or obtain the consent of her parents for
an abortion.34  Many states have also made separate exceptions to pa-
rental consent requirements for minors who have destructive relation-
ships with their parents, particularly if their pregnancy may be the
result of sexual assault by a parent.35  However, the Court’s line of
cases concerning parental consent laws demonstrate that there are
few “hard lines”—many questions remain unanswered as to how the
rights of parents, children, and the states should be balanced.36  As
discussed infra, even more questions remain when the pregnant minor
desires—to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her
parents.”).
30. See Pedagno, supra note 4.
31. Id. at 187.
32. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.  Although the “alternative procedure” is discussed in
terms of a judicial proceeding, the Court clarified in a footnote:
We do not suggest, however, that a State choosing to require parental
consent could not delegate the alternative procedure to a juvenile court
or an administrative agency or officer.  Indeed, much can be said for em-
ploying procedures and a forum less formal than those associated with a
court of general jurisdiction.
Id. at 643 & 657 n.22.
33. Id. at 643–44.
34. See STATE POLICIES, supra note 4. But see Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v.
Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Bellotti’s judicial bypass re-
quirement does not apply to parental notification statutes in the same way it
applies to parental consent statutes).
35. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 182 (noting these exceptions usually only apply when
the parent is the perpetrator, and the evidence required to establish assault
varies).
36. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 180.
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is without access to a parental figure who can legally provide consent
for an abortion, such as a minor in foster care.
B. Teen Pregnancy and Abortion in Foster Care
There are currently over 400,000 children living in foster care in
the United States.37  Of those children, forty-eight percent are girls.38
Studies have shown girls in foster care are two-and-a-half times more
likely than their peers in the general population to get pregnant by
the age of nineteen.39  One study found that forty-eight percent of
girls in foster care had been pregnant at least once by the age of
nineteen.40  More disheartening is the fact that teen mothers are
twice as likely to have their children placed in foster care or have at
least one reported case of child abuse or neglect compared to mothers
who waited until later in life to have children.41  These figures indi-
cate that girls in foster care who have children are more likely to re-
peat the cycle and perpetuate the very system that aims to protect
children from harm and distress.
Although the causes of teen pregnancy in foster care vary at an
individual level, there are certain risk factors that could lead adoles-
cents in foster care to engage in risky sexual activity earlier than their
peers.  Some studies have shown that the lack of close relationships
with parental figures leads to a lower rate of contraceptive use.42
Often, social workers do not have the time or resources to educate
teens on safe sex, and foster parents may not feel comfortable discuss-
ing such sensitive subjects with children who are placed in their home
only temporarily.43  Moreover, studies suggest foster youth experience
greater social acceptance of early pregnancy from their peers, and
many want to have a baby at an early age.44  Often, foster youth per-
37. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, FOSTER CARE STA-
TISTICS 2013, at 1 (2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J2DR-XMVK.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 173; see also Heather D. Boonstra, Teen Pregnancy
Among Young Women in Foster Care: A Primer, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV.,
Spring 2011, at 8, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/NB6B-Q6JA (providing an
overview of foster youth and pregnancy).
40. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 173.
41. Id.; see also Jennifer Friedman, Cause for Concern: Unwanted Pregnancy and
Childbirth Among Adolescents in Foster Care, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2013/jan_mar_2013/cause_for_
concern_unwanted_pregnancy_and_childbirth_among_adolescents_in_foster_
care/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/B586-8RKB (discussing the significant
problem of pregnant adolescents in foster care).
42. Carlie J. Armstrong, Bypassing Her Constitutional Rights: How the Nebraska Su-
preme Court Set a Damaging Precedent for Pregnant Minors Seeking Abortion
Care, 9 MOD. AM. 10, 14 (2014).
43. Id.
44. Friedman, supra note 41.
2016] JUDICIAL BYPASS IN NEBRASKA 1035
ceive a child of their own as an opportunity to start a new life, find a
sense of stability, and create the family they never had while proving
themselves to be more capable at child rearing than their birth par-
ents.45  Thus, teenagers in foster care may not be as motivated as
other young people to prevent pregnancy.
Nonetheless, research indicates that unwanted pregnancies and
births among foster youth far outnumber the wanted.46  While there is
little information about the number of pregnant girls in foster care
who seek abortions,47 some studies have suggested that “[m]ost foster
girls have their babies, whether they wish to or not.”48  One study
found that only 4.7% of pregnant teens in foster care terminated their
pregnancy, compared to the national average of thirty-two percent of
teen pregnancies terminated nationwide.49  These numbers suggest
that girls in foster care who wish to end their pregnancy face a num-
ber of hurdles—far more than their counterparts who are not in foster
care.
Foster youth face a unique set of obstacles when it comes to paren-
tal consent or notification requirements for abortion.  Many states fail
to consider who should be notified, or who is authorized to consent to
the abortion procedure when the patient is a ward of the state.50
When a child is committed to the state, the government child welfare
agency (for example, the Department of Health and Human Services
or Child Protective Services) becomes her legal guardian.51  However,
many state child welfare agencies—including Nebraska’s—refuse to
provide consent for abortion procedures.52  Thus, foster youth residing
in states that require parental consent for abortions often have no one
to turn to, as they are without a parent or guardian who can legally
provide consent.
There are several reasons why state child welfare agencies may
refuse to provide legal consent for abortions.  First, agencies may be
hesitant to consent when there is no available funding for the proce-
dure.53  A federal policy known as the Hyde Amendment prohibits
states from spending federal dollars on abortion services unless the
45. Id.; see also Amy Sullivan, Teen Pregnancy: An Epidemic in Foster Care, TIME
(July 22, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1911854,00
.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Z8N5-G7SD (“‘For some foster youth,’
says University of Chicago researcher Amy Dworsky, ‘having a child is a way to
create a family that they don’t have, or to fill an emotional void.’”).
46. Friedman, supra note 41.
47. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 173.
48. Moore, supra note 6, at 41.
49. Id. at 41–42.
50. Id. at 32.
51. In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640, 657, 838 N.W.2d 226, 229 (2013) (Connolly, J.,
dissenting).
52. Id.; see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
53. See Rebouche´, supra note 8.
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pregnancy is the result of rape or incest or if there is a medical emer-
gency placing the pregnant woman’s life in danger.54  The Hyde
Amendment is not a permanent law, but rather a “rider” that has rou-
tinely been attached to annual appropriations bills since Roe v.
Wade.55
Second, even if the minor is able to pay for the abortion procedure
on her own, child welfare agencies often refuse to provide consent be-
cause they fear repercussions due to federal or state regulatory provi-
sions.  For example, Alabama passed a state regulation that
preempted child welfare agencies from consenting to abortions based
on the presumption that the state would lose federal funding under
the Hyde Amendment.56  Similarly, while Nebraska state regulations
provide that a caseworker should provide unbiased information to a
pregnant state ward without acting to “encourage, discour-
age . . . prevent or require the abortion,” the Department of Health
and Human Services (the Department) will not provide consent for the
abortion procedure.57
Having no one to turn to for consent, a pregnant foster youth who
wishes to terminate her pregnancy is often left with only one option—
to petition the court for judicial authorization for the abortion proce-
dure.  On the surface, the court system appears to provide some re-
course for pregnant minors who are unable or unwilling to obtain
parental consent.  However, a closer look reveals that pregnant girls
in foster care who wish to terminate their pregnancy by way of judicial
authorization face an “incredible uphill battle.”58
54. Id. at n.161.  However, states may pay for or subsidize abortion services using
their own funds. See, e.g., Public Funding for Abortion, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/map.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/WQ5V-Y9UT (providing a map showing which
states fund abortion for low-income women voluntarily or because of a court
order).
55. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 198 n.175.
56. See Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So.2d 901, 902 (Ala. 1988) (“[The child protective
agency] takes the position that it cannot give consent because of regulatory
prohibitions against an agency receiving Federal funds if it participates in a deci-
sion for an abortion.”).
57. 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 11-002.04A (2016) (“If a ward decides to have an abor-
tion, the consent of the parent(s) or Department is not required, but notification
may be required unless [certain conditions] exist.”).  However, this regulation has
not been reformed since recent amendments to Nebraska law, which changed the
notification requirement to a consent requirement. See infra section II.C.
58. Rebecca Gudeman, Nebraska Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Foster Youth’s Abil-
ity to Obtain an Abortion, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www
.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2013/oct_dec_2013/nebraska_supreme_court_
deals_a_blow_to_foster_youths_ability_to_obtain_an_abortion/#sdfootnote4sym,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Z8DQ-XNS6.
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C. Nebraska’s Parental Consent Law and the Supreme
Court’s Holding in Anonymous 5
Nebraska law has traditionally barred a physician from perform-
ing an abortion on an unemancipated pregnant woman under the age
of eighteen without first providing notification to a parent or guardian
forty-eight hours in advance.59  However, in 2011, the Nebraska legis-
lature amended the law to require the written, notarized consent of at
least one parent or legal guardian.60  The law includes a judicial by-
pass mechanism, by which the court may waive the consent require-
ment if it determines “by clear and convincing evidence that the
pregnant woman is both sufficiently mature and well-informed to de-
cide whether to have an abortion.”61  Additionally, if the court finds
“clear and convincing evidence” of child abuse or neglect, or that it
would be in the best interests of the minor to obtain an abortion with-
out the consent of a parent or guardian, the court shall issue an order
authorizing the pregnant woman to consent to the abortion without
the consent of a parent or a guardian.62  Additionally, the law man-
dates that the judicial bypass process and any appeal should be expe-
dited while ensuring the complete anonymity and confidentiality of
the minor.63
Anonymous 5 provided the first opportunity for the Nebraska Su-
preme Court to consider a petition for waiver of parental consent
under the amended Nebraska law.64  The petitioner, a sixteen-year-
old state ward, had been in foster care for the preceding two-and-a-
half years as a result of abuse and neglect from her biological par-
ents.65  Five months prior to the case, the juvenile court terminated
the rights of her biological parents.66  At ten weeks along in her preg-
nancy, she requested that the district court authorize her to obtain an
abortion without the written consent of a parent or guardian.67
The petitioner explained to the district court judge that she wished
to have an abortion because she did not feel she could “financially sup-
port a child or be the right mom that [she] would like to be.”68  She
also explained that she did not want her foster parents to know about
her pregnancy because she feared she could lose her placement due to
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6901 (Reissue 2009), amended by L.B. 690, 102d Leg. Sess.
§§ 3–15 (Neb. 2011).
60. See L.B. 690 §§ 3–15; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6902 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(2) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
62. Id. § 71-6903(3).
63. See id. § 71-6903(8)–(11).
64. In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640, 645, 838 N.W.2d 226, 232 (2013) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 643, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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her foster parents’ “strong religious beliefs about abortion.”69  She did
not want to put the child up for adoption because she feared her foster
parents would respond harshly and tell her siblings she was a “bad
person.”70  The petitioner further explained that before making her
decision she received six counseling sessions and three ultrasounds
during which the risks associated with terminating a pregnancy were
discussed with her.71  The district court judge responded, “[W]hen you
have an abortion, it’s going to kill the child inside you,” and asked if
she would “rather do that than to risk problems with the foster care
people?”72  The petitioner answered “yes.”73
The district court denied the petitioner’s request for judicial by-
pass, finding that she was not sufficiently mature to decide on her own
whether to have an abortion.74  The district court based this finding
on the fact that she was only sixteen years old and dependent on her
foster parents.75  Additionally, the district court held that since the
rights of her biological parents had been terminated, her foster par-
ents were her guardians for the purpose of providing consent.76  The
district court found it was not in the petitioner’s best interests to have
an abortion without the consent of one of her foster parents.77  She
promptly appealed.78
In reviewing the case de novo, the Nebraska Supreme Court up-
held the district court’s decision and agreed that the petitioner was
not sufficiently mature and well-informed to decide whether to have
an abortion.79  The court also held that in order for the exception for
abuse or neglect to apply “the pregnant woman must establish that a
parent or guardian, who fills that role at the time she files her petition,
has abused or neglected her.”80  Because the petitioner’s foster par-
ents had not abused nor neglected her, the exception did not apply.
The court did not consider the petitioner’s contention that the district
court judge should have recused himself for bias.81  Additionally, al-
though she asserted that she had no guardian to provide consent for
her in the absence of a judicial authorization, the Nebraska Supreme
Court sidestepped the question of whether the Department could pro-
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 649–50, 838 N.W.2d at 235.
72. Id. at 643, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 644, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 643–44, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
77. Id. at 644, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
78. Id. at 642–43, 838 N.W.2d at 230.  She appealed pursuant to the expedited proce-
dures provided by NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6904 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
79. Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. at 645, 838 N.W.2d at 237.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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vide consent, or whether the petitioner’s foster parents were her
guardians for purposes of providing consent.82
Also at issue in Anonymous 5 was Section 390 of the Nebraska Ad-
ministrative Code, which states that “[a] female ward has the right to
obtain a legal abortion” and “[i]f a ward decides to have an abortion,
the consent of the parent(s) or Department is not required, but notifi-
cation may be required unless [certain conditions] exist.”83  The court
first observed that the regulation had not been amended or super-
seded in light of the recent change in Nebraska law, which amended
the notification requirement to a consent requirement.84  Nonetheless,
the court “assumed” the regulation remained effective, but refused to
rule on whether the petitioner should be granted an abortion under
the regulation.85
Writing for the dissent, Justice William Connolly emphasized the
legislature’s mistake in assuming that all minors would have a parent
or guardian who can give consent for a minor’s abortion,86 and con-
cluded that the petitioner was without a parent or guardian to provide
consent.87  Moreover, he reiterated that state regulations prohibit the
Department from providing consent.88  He concluded that the district
court erred in holding that the petitioner’s foster parents could pro-
vide consent, because foster parents are granted no legal authority to
consent to an abortion or any other major medical procedure.89  As a
result, Justice Connolly stated: “She is in a legal limbo—a quandary of
the Legislature’s making.”90
The dissent also concluded the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case at all.91  Nebraska law provides that a
minor may seek court authorization for an abortion “[i]f [she] elects
not to obtain the consent of her parents or guardians.”92  Justice Con-
nolly maintained that as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the minor must
elect not to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian; because the
petitioner had no one who could consent, she could not “elect” not to
obtain consent.93  Therefore, Justice Connolly concluded that the ju-
risdictional prerequisite was not met; thus, the court had no subject
82. Id.
83. Id. at 650, 838 N.W.2d at 235; 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 11-002.04A (2016).
84. Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. at 650, 838 N.W.2d at 235.
85. Id.  See infra section III.A for an analysis of why this regulation is of no avail to
state wards seeking an abortion under the new Nebraska law.
86. Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. at 658, 838 N.W.2d at 240 (Connolly, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 654, 838 N.W.2d at 238.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 657, 838 N.W.2d at 239.
90. Id. at 654, 838 N.W.2d at 238.
91. Id. at 655, 838 N.W.2d at 238.
92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(2) (Cum. Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).
93. Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. at 655, 838 N.W.2d at 238 (Connolly, J., dissenting).
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matter jurisdiction over her request for a judicial bypass.94  Justice
Connolly noted that this conclusion meant none of the statutory excep-
tions applied, resulting in an absolute and unconstitutional ban on the
petitioner’s right to an abortion.95
III. ANALYSIS
A. Nebraska’s Parental Consent Law Grants Judges an
Impermissible, “Absolute, and Possibly Arbitrary,
Veto” Over a State Ward’s Access to Abortion
In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the unique nature
and consequences of the abortion decision when it held that it is un-
constitutional for a state “to give a third party an absolute, and possi-
bly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to
terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for with-
holding the consent.”96  In Bellotti, the Court again emphasized the
importance of preventing a complete third party “veto” when it
handed down its decision requiring that minors have the option for
judicial bypass.97  Both cases indicate that the Court has placed sig-
nificant value on a pregnant woman’s decision to terminate her preg-
nancy, even when she is a minor.98
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a state law requiring
a minor to seek parental consent for an abortion before pursuing judi-
cial authorization fails to “provide an effective avenue of relief for
some of those who need it most.”99  When the judicial bypass process
was created, it was assumed that a pregnant minor would have some-
one—whether it be a parent, guardian, or even grandparent100—to
provide consent.  However, as evidenced by Anonymous 5, such is not
always the case.  The Court has not addressed an instance where a
minor does not have a parent or guardian who can legally consent to
the abortion procedure, in which case judicial bypass serves as the mi-
nor’s only option.  Unfortunately, under Nebraska law, it is the judi-
94. Id. at 661, 838 N.W.2d at 242.
95. Id.
96. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
97. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
98. See Pedagno, supra note 4, at 181 (asserting that a state’s right to mandate
parental consent for other decisions of a minor would be met with “very little
constitutional argument,” but that a minor is afforded more “perspective”
and “judgment” in the abortion decision “solely because of the nature of
the . . . decision”).
99. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
100. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6902.01 (Cum. Supp. 2011) (requiring that if the preg-
nant woman declares she is a victim of abuse or neglect, the “physician shall
obtain the notarized written consent required by § 71-6902 from a grandparent”).
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cial bypass process itself that threatens to deprive an entire class of
pregnant minors from effective relief.101
As the dissent in Anonymous 5 correctly pointed out, the peti-
tioner—a pregnant girl in foster care—had no guardian or parent that
could legally provide consent for her to obtain an abortion.102  Justice
Connolly stated:
The petitioner has no legal parents; the juvenile court terminated their paren-
tal rights.  Her legal guardian, the Department—by regulation—will not give
her consent.  And although the district court has required her to get her foster
parents’ consent to obtain an abortion, their consent would be meaningless
under the law because they are neither parents nor guardians.  She is in a
legal limbo—a quandary of the Legislature’s making.103
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to rule on whether
Section 390 of the Nebraska Administrative Code provides an alter-
nate route for a minor in foster care to consent to her own abortion
procedure, it is unlikely that this regulation could provide any relief.
As the court noted, the regulation has not been updated since the re-
cent change from a notification to a consent requirement under Ne-
braska law.104  Furthermore, interpreting the plain language of the
regulation would likely lead a court to conclude that it does not pro-
vide an exception for a state ward under Nebraska law.  The relevant
parts of the regulation state:
A female ward has the right to obtain a legal abortion . . . . The child’s worker
will provide unbiased information to the ward regarding alternatives and ap-
propriate agencies and resources for further assistance.  The worker will not
encourage, discourage, or act to prevent or require the abortion.  If a ward
decides to have an abortion, the consent of the parent(s) or Department is not
required, but notification may be required unless [an exception] exists.105
The language of the regulation indicates that the Department
must strive to comply with state law regarding parental notification,
not parental consent.106  Furthermore, the regulation states that a
state ward has the right to obtain a legal abortion—meaning the abor-
tion must be legal under Nebraska law.  However, under Nebraska
law, it is illegal for a minor to obtain an abortion without the consent
101. Armstrong, supra note 42, at 15.
102. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-905(1) (Cum. Supp. 2015) (“The Department of Health
and Human Services shall be the legal guardian of all children committed to it.”);
see also Pedagno, supra note 4, at 193 (“Because the child welfare agency has
legal custody over the child, ‘[f]oster parents have little real authority regarding
medical care.’” (quoting SCHWEITZER & LARSEN, supra note 7, at 34)).
103. In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640, 654, 838 N.W.2d 226, 238 (2013) (Connolly, J.,
dissenting).
104. Id. at 650, 838 N.W.2d at 235 (majority opinion).
105. 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 11-002.04A (2016).  The exceptions following are those
that have traditionally been included in the Nebraska law, such as the case of a
medical emergency, or if the pregnant ward is a victim of abuse, neglect, or sex-
ual abuse. Id.
106. Id. (“Consent is not required, but notification may be required.”).
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of a parent or guardian, or without authorization from a court, unless
an exception applies.107  Therefore, this outdated provision of the Ad-
ministrative Code provides no relief for a pregnant state ward such as
the petitioner in Anonymous 5.
Because the petitioner in Anonymous 5 did not have a parent or
guardian who could legally consent, her only option was to petition the
court for a judicial bypass.  Thus, the court system was the petitioner’s
sole route of access to her fundamental right to an abortion.  The peti-
tioner found herself at the mercy of a single decision-maker who could
either approve or deny her request—the district court judge.
The level of discretion exercised by the judge in a judicial bypass
proceeding creates the same risk of an arbitrary veto that the judicial
bypass process was designed to address in the first place.  In fact, in
many cases a pregnant minor may be worse off having a judge as the
sole decision-maker.  In a judicial bypass proceeding, the minor must
convince the judge—who she may be meeting for the first time—that
an abortion would be in her best interests, or that she is sufficiently
mature to make the decision on her own.  Someone more familiar with
the minor, such as a family member, mentor, or caseworker is better
positioned to understand the totality of circumstances in order to as-
sist the minor in making such a life-altering decision.108  Nonetheless,
a pregnant minor in foster care is unable to obtain consent necessary
for an abortion from anyone other than a judge.
In his concurring opinion in Bellotti, Justice Stevens took issue
with the statutory requirement of third-party consent—whether it be
parental or judicial—in all cases.109  He recognized that:
[T]he only standard provided for the judge’s decision is the best interest of the
minor . . . [which] provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision
must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores whose en-
forcement upon the minor—particularly when contrary to her own informed
and reasonable decision—is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests un-
derlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision.110
Three-and-a-half decades after Bellotti, legislation continues to af-
ford judges ample discretion by mandating best interests and matur-
ity standards with little specificity.111  Thus, judges are left to
107. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6902 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
108. Kohm, supra note 4, at 1348; see also infra section II.A (outlining the purpose of
parental consent laws as honoring the child rearing rights of parents, as well as
the need for adolescents to have support and guidance).  Although this assertion
may seem to support the district court’s finding that the minor’s foster parents
should provide consent, compare infra section II.A (explaining that her foster
parents are legally unable to provide consent), with infra section III.C  (arguing
that foster parents or another party close to the minor should be given legal
rights to consent).
109. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 655–56.
111. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 186.
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determine whether a minor should be permitted to terminate her
pregnancy with no objective guidelines.  Although judges are expected
to resolve issues by “constitutional measurement, free of emotion and
of predilection,”112 one can only imagine the inherent difficulty a
judge must face in separating individual beliefs and convictions on the
emotional subject of abortion from a determination of a child’s best
interests, which is itself a subjective determination.
The judge’s power to veto a state ward’s abortion decision is rarely,
if ever, mitigated by appellate review.  Even under a de novo review, it
is very unlikely that an appellate court will overrule a lower court’s
decision when based on an assessment of the minor’s maturity and
best interests.113  In Anonymous 2, the concurrence pointed out that
while evaluating the maturity of a minor is “difficult enough for a trial
or appellate judge, the task is made even more difficult when that
evaluation hinges solely on the testimony of a minor.”114  As a result,
the court held in Anonymous 5 that many of the factors necessary to
evaluate maturity “cannot be discerned from the cold record before us
and are another reason why we elect to give weight to the fact that the
trial judge heard and observed Petitioner in finding her not to be ma-
ture and well informed.”115
Anonymous 5 clearly illustrates an instance in which a judge’s life-
altering veto of a woman’s right to abortion was not only absolute, but
also arbitrary.  Due to the lack of objective guidelines, the judge was
given great leeway to rule based on his subjective evaluation of
whether the petitioner was “sufficiently mature” to make the decision
on her own, or whether the abortion would be in her best interests.
The district court judge denied the petitioner’s request, citing no objec-
tive criteria besides the fact that she was sixteen years old and depen-
dent on her foster parents.116  By holding that it was not in the
petitioner’s best interests to have an abortion without the consent of
her foster parents and concluding that she was not sufficiently mature
to make the decision on her own, the district court judge exerted his
112. Id.
113. Compare In re Anonymous 1, 251 Neb. 424, 558 N.W.2d 784 (1997) (upholding a
lower court judgment finding that the minor did not establish sufficient maturity
or that notifying at least one of her parents would not be in her best interests),
and In re Anonymous 2, 253 Neb. 485, 570 N.W.2d 836 (1997) (holding that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that the minor had the requisite level of
experience, perspective, and judgment to support an order authorizing an abor-
tion without parental consent), with In re Anonymous 3, 279 Neb. 912, 782
N.W.2d 591 (2010) (overturning the lower court’s holding that the minor was
emancipated and therefore neither judicial bypass nor parental notification was
required).
114. Anonymous 2, 253 Neb. at 490, 570 N.W.2d at 840 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
115. In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640, 648–49, 838 N.W.2d 226, 234 (2013) (per
curiam).
116. Id. at 644, 838 N.W.2d 226 at 231.
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authority as the sole decision-maker and effected a complete, arbi-
trary, and impermissible veto on the fundamental right of a vulnera-
ble minor.
B. Nebraska’s Parental Consent Law Imposes an Undue
Burden on State Wards Seeking an Abortion
In Bellotti, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “if the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents’ consent to
an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”117  The Court also
concluded that “every minor must have the opportunity—if she so
desires—to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying
her parents,” and “the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not
be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to
court.”118 Bellotti was reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,119 which held that state regulations
governing abortion, including parental consent laws, are permissible
only “[i]f they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of
the right to choose.”120
Nebraska’s parental consent law imposes the very same “undue
burden” and “substantial obstacle” on a state ward’s access to abortion
as cautioned against in Bellotti and Casey.  When a pregnant girl in
foster care is unable to obtain parental consent for an abortion, her
only options are to forgo the abortion or seek judicial authorization for
the procedure.  As Justice Stevens emphasized in his concurrence in
Bellotti, “I would suppose that the need to commence judicial proceed-
ings in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least
as great as, and probably greater than that imposed on the minor
child by the need to obtain the consent of a parent.”121  Unfortunately,
Justice Stevens’ prediction has revealed itself to be exceptionally accu-
rate, as it is often impossible or extremely difficult for a pregnant mi-
nor to utilize the process “without significant delay, cost, or
embarrassment.”122
At the outset, the risk is great that a pregnant foster youth will be
completely uninformed of her right to seek judicial authorization for
an abortion.123  Conversely, she might be aware of the judicial bypass
option but unsure how to navigate the court system quickly enough to
obtain authorization for the procedure while still protecting her pri-
117. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
118. Id. at 647–48.
119. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
120. Id. at 877.
121. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 177.
123. Moore, supra note 6, at 41.
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vacy interests.124  Because of the non-permanent nature of foster care,
foster youth who become pregnant often worry that they will lose their
placement or jeopardize future placements if their pregnancy or abor-
tion decision is discovered.125  As a result, foster youth may not feel
comfortable asking their caseworker or others involved in their case
for help with the judicial bypass process.126
If a pregnant foster youth decides to take her request for waiver of
parental consent to a judge, she must somehow figure out how to navi-
gate the cumbersome court system, which poses many difficulties—
particularly to a young girl in foster care.  First, she is faced with
meeting the court’s pleading requirements.  Nebraska law requires
that the State Court Administrator create a petition form and instruc-
tions on the judicial bypass procedure, and then post a sufficient num-
ber of petition forms and instructions “in each courthouse, in such a
place that members of the general public may obtain a form and in-
structions without requesting [them] from the clerk.”127  Although the
legislature likely intended to make it as easy as possible for vulnera-
ble minors seeking relief to access the forms, this effort was counter-
acted by a lack of flexibility from the court in Anonymous 5.
Specifically, the appellate court refused to consider the petitioner’s ar-
gument that she lacked a parent or guardian for the purpose of provid-
ing consent because her original petition did not mention it as a
specific concern.128
In his dissent, Justice Connolly emphasized the absurdity of hold-
ing a vulnerable minor to the same pleading standards as an attor-
124. Id. Although Nebraska law includes provisions relating to confidentiality and
timeliness of the proceedings, an unrepresented minor may not be aware of these
protections when deciding whether to pursue judicial bypass. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-6903(8) (Cum. Supp. 2011) (mandating the confidentiality of all pro-
ceedings and documents to ensure the anonymity of the pregnant woman, and
stating that “[o]nly the pregnant woman, the pregnant woman’s guardian ad li-
tem, the pregnant woman’s attorney, and a person whose presence is specifically
requested by the pregnant woman or [her] attorney may attend the hearing on
the petition.”); id. § 71-6903(10) (requiring the court to give petitions for judicial
bypass precedence over other pending matters and make a ruling within seven
days).
125. Moore, supra note 6, at 47; see also In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640, 643, 838
N.W.2d 226, 231 (2013) (per curiam) (“[The petitioner] explained that she did not
want her foster parents to know about her pregnancy because she feared she
could lose her placement due to her foster parents’ ‘strong religious beliefs about
abortion.’”).
126. A foster youth’s apprehension of jeopardizing her privacy interests by involving
her caseworker is not unfounded.  Nebraska regulations provide that “the worker
will inform the ward that her/his [sic] decision may not remain confidential”
when discussing the abortion decision with a state ward.  390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE
§ 11-002.04A (2016).
127. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(7).
128. Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. at 653–54, 838 N.W.2d at 237.
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ney.129  Doing so, he argued, places an unconstitutional burden on a
minor seeking an abortion.130  As Justice Connolly pointed out, the
pleading for a judicial bypass proceeding is made up of “blanks and
checkmarks” and is “intended to be a simple filing that a minor can
navigate.”131  Additionally, an attorney is usually not appointed for
the minor for the judicial bypass proceeding until after the petition is
filed.132  In such an instance where the state’s parental consent law
fails to take into account the unique circumstances of foster youth,
leaving the judge as the sole decision-maker, the court should be as
flexible as possible so as to not effectively bar the minor’s access to
abortion on purely procedural grounds.
Assuming the foster youth is able to make it past the pleading
stage in her request for a judicial bypass, she could face a potential
conflict of interest if her case is heard in front of the same court or
judge that has jurisdiction over her foster care case.  This concern is
particularly relevant in rural areas, where juvenile courts and courts
of general jurisdiction are often one in the same.133  For example, a
pregnant minor could appear in court and request authorization to
terminate her pregnancy without notifying or obtaining consent from
the Department or her foster parents.  Shortly after, the same minor
could appear in front of the same judge for a different hearing, in
which the Department may argue that it is in her “best interests” that
her medications be altered.134  In such instances, “[t]he judge is pre-
vented from revealing the minor’s abortion decision, yet he also has an
obligation to her and her family concerning the provision of a safe and
healthy foster-care environment.”135
Even if a foster youth’s request for judicial authorization is
granted, she is likely to face significant difficulty paying for the proce-
dure, which may cost up to $1,500 in the first trimester.136  The vast
majority of children in foster care receive Medicaid, which cannot be
used to fund abortion services.137  Furthermore, since Nebraska has
129. Id. at 660, 838 N.W.2d at 241 (Connolly, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. The Nebraska State Judicial System, NEBRASKA.GOV, https://supremecourt.nebra
ska.gov/4853/nebraska-state-judicial-system (last visited Feb. 14, 2016), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/G7WP-MDG8 (“Nebraska has three separate juvenile
courts located in Douglas, Lancaster, and Sarpy Counties.  In the remaining
counties, juvenile matters are heard in the county courts.”).
134. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 196–97.
135. Id.
136. In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedpar
enthood.org/learn/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures (last visited Feb. 13,
2016), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JQ4N-6PTZ.
137. Moore, supra note 6, at 49–50 (“Medicaid recipients are entitled to funding for
abortion under the Hyde Amendment in cases of rape, incest, or life endanger-
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implemented stringent restrictions on state funding for abortions,
state funding would only be available in the most extreme circum-
stances.138  Thus, the petitioner would have to use her own resources,
if any, or rely on assistance from a not-for-profit organization that as-
sists low-income women with abortion funding.139
Given the many obstacles that foster youth face in obtaining judi-
cial authorization for an abortion when consent is unavailable, it is
not surprising that “[m]ost foster girls have their babies, whether they
wish to or not.”140  These obstacles impose an undue burden on a fos-
ter youth’s access to abortion.  When taken into consideration along
with a foster youth’s inability to obtain parental consent as a ward of
the state, it’s questionable whether access to abortion has been essen-
tially barred for this population.
C. Nebraska’s Abortion Law Needs Reform to Clarify
Parental Consent Requirements and Judicial Bypass
Considerations for State Wards
In January 2014, Nebraska State Senator Danielle Conrad intro-
duced legislation that proposed several revisions to Nebraska’s abor-
tion law.141  Legislative Bill 1109 (LB 1109) would have repealed the
parental consent requirements that were enacted in 2011, while rein-
stating the less stringent requirement of parental notification.142  Ad-
ditionally, it would have altered the requirement that the minor be
“sufficiently mature and well-informed” to instead require that the mi-
nor be “mature and capable of giving informed consent.”  The proposed
amendment also clarified that a best-interests determination should
be made separately and independently from the finding of whether the
minor is “mature and capable of informed consent.”143
Although LB 1109 ultimately was not passed by the Nebraska leg-
islature, the bill and its proposed changes indicate at least some
awareness among Nebraska lawmakers about the many predicaments
caused by the parental consent requirement.  A reversion to the re-
quirement of parental notification rather than parental consent would
ment, but, barring such situations, may not receive federal funds.”) (internal cita-
tions omitted).  See supra section II.B for an explanation of the Hyde
Amendment’s impact on abortion funding.
138. See Public Funding for Abortion, supra note 54 (providing a map showing which
states fund abortion for low-income women voluntarily or because of a court
order).
139. See Moore, supra note 6, at 49 & 50 n.111.
140. Id. at 41.
141. L.B. 1109, 103d Leg. 2d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2013).  The proposed legislation would
have also amended the mens rea requirement and certain penalties for physicians
charged in violation of the law.
142. Id. at §§ 4–5.
143. Id. § 5.
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lessen the burden on marginalized pregnant minors who seek an abor-
tion.  Nebraska’s Administrative Code relating to abortion for state
wards would no longer be obsolete, as the Department could receive
notification for the minor to obtain a legal abortion.  More impor-
tantly, an entire class of vulnerable women would not be subject to the
arbitrary veto of a judge who controls their destiny in a judicial bypass
decision.
However, because LB 1109 was unsuccessful in the 2014 legisla-
tive session, the drawbacks of Nebraska’s parental consent law, as evi-
denced by Anonymous 5, remain.  If the legislature wishes to retain
the consent requirement for minors seeking abortions, reform is neces-
sary to avoid overlooking an entire class of teenage girls who are per-
haps the most in need of the support that the law seeks to ensure.
1. Consent Requirements
As mentioned above, a reversion to a parental notification mandate
rather than a parental consent requirement would greatly reduce the
burden faced by pregnant state wards seeking an abortion.  On the
other hand, it is generally justifiable for the legislature to regard pa-
rental consent as essential in a minor’s abortion decision.  Such a deci-
sion is one that should be made only after serious and well-informed
consideration.  It is conceded that adolescents, especially those who
have experienced the sort of trauma that would land them in the fos-
ter care system, are “not generally known for their mature judg-
ments”144 and are therefore in need of support and guidance in
making their choice.
While the state has an interest in actively encouraging adolescents
to seek guidance on the abortion decision, the law should unambigu-
ously delineate who may provide consent when the minor does not
have a parent or guardian to fill that role.  Provided the objective of
the law is to protect the health and well-being of minors and to en-
courage dialogue about pregnancy options,145 the law should provide
flexibility by allowing an alternate person to consent when no parent
or guardian is available.  Such an exception would still provide the
indispensable guidance that follows when someone close to the minor
provides consent.146  Moreover, the availability of an alternate route
of legal consent for minors who are without parents or guardians
would lessen the burden faced by this population and prevent judges
from being placed in the position of sole decision-makers.
The Nebraska legislature should broaden the language of its pa-
rental consent statute in order to address the needs of marginalized
144. Pedagno, supra note 4, at 200.
145. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 174.
146. See Armstrong, supra note 42, at 15.
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pregnant minors.  For instance, it could bestow on foster parents the
right to consent to an abortion for a minor in their care.147  However,
foster parent consent should not be the only option available, as not all
state wards may wish to involve their foster parents in their decision.
Often, a state ward fears removal from her foster home when she be-
comes pregnant.148  To further complicate matters, foster parents may
not feel comfortable fulfilling such a role, or they may not have the
resources or training necessary to provide unbiased guidance to a
pregnant adolescent.149  Alternatively, the law could provide an ex-
ception under the parental consent requirement for a family relative
or other adult who is not a “parent or guardian” for purposes of the
statute, but nonetheless occupies an important role in the minor’s life.
As another option, the legislature could mandate that the Depart-
ment assume the responsibility of providing consent for pregnant mi-
nors in its care.  Contrary to the commonly held belief, it does not
necessarily follow that the state would lose federal funding.  Although
the Hyde Amendment preempts states from using federal funds to re-
imburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program,150 the
state could provide consent for the procedure without using federal
funds for the procedure.151
147. Allowing foster parents to legally provide consent for abortions for state wards in
their care would be in line with the “reasonable and prudent parent standard” for
foster homes that was recently recognized by federal law in the Preventing Sex
Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113–183, 128 Stat. 1919
(2014).  “The term ‘reasonable and prudent parent standard’ means the standard
characterized by careful and sensible parental decisions that maintain the
health, safety, and best interests of a child while at the same time encouraging
the emotional and developmental growth of the child.” Id. at 1923.  A bill pro-
posed by Nebraska State Senator Kathy Campbell in the 2016 legislative session
would implement the prudent parenting standard in Nebraska. See L.B. 746,
104th Leg. 2d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2016).
148. See Moore, supra note 6, at 130–31; see also Bryn Martyna, The Youth Perspective
on Laws Requiring Parental Involvement in the Decision to Have an Abortion,
NAT’L CTR. YOUTH LAW (July 1, 2013), http://youthlaw.org/publication/the-youth-
perspective-on-laws-requiring-parental-involvement-in-the-decision-to-have-an-
abortion/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5RZ9-JZRU
(providing an overview of youth perspectives on parental involvement laws).
149. See Moore, supra note 6, at 130–31.
150. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment).
151. Alas, the minor may have to seek funding on her own, as the state may also deny
funding for the procedure.  While the Supreme Court has held that a state may
not create an undue burden on a minor who seeks an abortion, it has also held
that states have no obligation to provide funding for abortion procedures. See
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (2013) (upholding a Connecticut regulation that
granted Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not for medically necessary abor-
tions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (“The Government has no con-
stitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is
constitutionally protected.”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (“[I]t sim-
ply does not follow [from Roe] that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a
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Lastly, the legislature should eliminate the use of the word “elect”
in parental consent legislation.  As Justice Connolly pointed out in his
dissent, the use of the word creates serious constitutional concerns by
possibly taking away the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over state
wards.  If a minor does not have a parent or guardian, she cannot elect
to obtain their consent.  While the majority of the court has not inter-
preted the word as a jurisdictional prerequisite, it nonetheless creates
the potential for a constitutional challenge when applied to this par-
ticular class of minors.
2. Judicial Bypass Considerations
As discussed in section III.A herein, a pregnant foster youth faces a
number of obstacles when utilizing the court system for judicial au-
thorization to terminate her pregnancy.  As such, specific standards
regarding the judicial bypass procedure are necessary to provide clear
guidance to judges and ensure that foster youth are aware of the op-
tion.  Such standards would lessen the burden faced by pregnant fos-
ter youth seeking abortion and prevent challenges on constitutional
grounds.
First, courts should be required to make independent evaluations
of the petitioner’s best interests and maturity, so that if the minor
seeking court authorization for an abortion does not meet one stan-
dard, she may meet the other.152  The ultimate holding of Bellotti
stated:
[E]very minor must have the opportunity—if she so desires—to go directly to
a court without first consulting or notifying her parents.  If she satisfies the
court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the
abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without pa-
rental consultation or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is com-
petent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that
an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests.153
As discussed in section II.C, supra, Nebraska includes a judicial
bypass mechanism, through which the court may waive the consent
requirement if it determines that an exception applies.  These excep-
tions allow the court to enter an order waiving the consent require-
ment if it determines that the minor is “sufficiently mature and well-
informed to decide whether to have an abortion.”154  Additionally, the
court may grant judicial authorization for an abortion if it finds that
there is evidence of child abuse or neglect, or that it would be in the
best interests of the minor to obtain an abortion without the consent of
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices.”).
152. Rebouche´, supra note 8, at 193–94 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651
(1979)).
153. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647–48 (emphasis added).
154. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(2) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
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a parent or guardian.155  Although the Nebraska Supreme Court did
articulate a clear and separate best-interest determination under the
previous law, which required only parental notification,156 the court
seemed to conflate maturity and best interests when ruling under the
new law requiring parental consent in Anonymous 5.157
There are strong arguments in favor of requiring a judge to make a
best-interest determination separately from the other exceptions, par-
ticularly when it comes to pregnant minors in foster care.  First and
foremost, whether the minor is “sufficiently mature” to decide to have
an abortion on her own is a separate question from whether the proce-
dure would be in her best interests, and thus the two questions should
be decided separately.  Furthermore, when it comes to the determina-
tion of whether a minor is sufficiently mature, the judge is deciding
whether there is justification to allow the minor to make the abortion
decision on her own and without the guidance of a parental figure.158
In a situation in which the minor has a parent who can consent, she is
not completely barred from obtaining an abortion when the judge de-
cides she is not mature—she still has the option to obtain parental
consent.  However, when a state ward is denied access to an abortion
based solely on the reason that she is not “sufficiently mature,” she
does not have the same option.  Thus, it is exceptionally important
that a separate best-interest determination be made for minors in fos-
ter care in order to avoid a complete ban on abortions for state wards
deemed to lack the requisite level of maturity.
Second, judges should be given clear guidelines in making the best-
interests determination.  As evidenced by Anonymous 5, a determina-
tion of a minor’s best interests on an issue as emotionally charged as
abortion without clear guidelines is far too likely to produce a ruling
based on subjective factors alone.  It is conceded that “[e]ven when ju-
rists reason from shared premises, some disagreement is inevitable.
That is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which
must accommodate life’s complexity.”159  Nonetheless, having clear
guidelines in place would greatly reduce the risk of judges inserting
155. Id. § 71-6903(3).
156. See In re Anonymous 1, 251 Neb. 424, 558 N.W.2d 784 (1997) (upholding a lower
court judgment that the minor did not establish sufficient maturity or that notify-
ing at least one of her parents would not be in her best interests); In re Anony-
mous 2, 253 Neb. 485, 570 N.W.2d 836 (1997) (holding that evidence was
insufficient to establish that the minor had the requisite level of experience, per-
spective, and judgment to support an order authorizing abortion without parental
consent); In re Anonymous 3, 279 Neb. 912, 782 N.W.2d 591 (2010) (overturning
the lower court holding that the minor was emancipated and therefore neither
judicial bypass nor parental notification was required).
157. In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640, 648–50, 838 N.W.2d 226, 234–35 (2013) (per
curiam).
158. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647–48.
159. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
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their own values and beliefs into the best-interests determination.
The probability that a judge’s ruling will “reflect personal and societal
values and mores”160 when a fundamental right is at stake is a risk
that no legislature should be willing to take.
In making the best-interests determination, judges should limit
considerations regarding the extent to which the minor has consulted
with her foster parents.  A very problematic holding in Anonymous 5
was that “it is not in the best interests of petitioner to have an abor-
tion without the consent of one of her foster parents.”161  Although
Bellotti permits the consideration of parental involvement when it
comes to the best-interests determination,162 a decision based on that
factor alone would set a dangerous precedent.  In doing so, the court
effectively defied the ultimate purpose of a judicial bypass proceeding
by giving the foster parents a veto over the minor’s decision, without a
separate best-interests determination by the court.
Lastly, the Department should be required to provide information
to minors in its care about their right to judicial bypass, as well as
provide resources to help them navigate the process.  It is important
that a pregnant minor is aware of all the options available to her.
When resources are not readily available, she may feel humiliation or
concern for her privacy if she is forced to seek out the Department for
help.  In such instances, the minor’s utilization of the judicial bypass
option may cause harm in itself.163  Therefore, it is important that she
be provided as much information as possible, so that she may effec-
tively weigh her options and navigate the system while maintaining
her dignity.
IV. CONCLUSION
State laws requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion
decision are designed to protect the best interests of a pregnant minor,
while recognizing the right to parental autonomy in child rearing.
Nonetheless, abortion is a fundamental right that must be balanced
with the competing interests of the state.  The United States Supreme
Court has held that although states may impose parental consent re-
quirements for a minor seeking an abortion, such requirements must
not give another party absolute—and possibly arbitrary—veto power
over the minor’s right to an abortion, nor may they impose an undue
160. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 655–56.
161. Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. at 644, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
162. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648 (“On the other hand, the court may deny the abortion
request of an immature minor in the absence of parental consultation if it con-
cludes that her best interests would be served thereby, or the court may in such a
case defer decision until there is parental consultation in which the court may
participate.”).
163. See Moore, supra note 6.
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burden on the minor’s ability to seek an abortion.  Moreover, the Court
has recognized that “there are few situations in which denying a mi-
nor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.”164
Anonymous 5 illustrates the complex issues facing a pregnant mi-
nor who is a ward of the state without a parental figure to provide
legal consent.  While the option of a judicial bypass would appear to
provide a remedy, it has proven inadequate.  When applied to preg-
nant minors in foster care, Nebraska’s judicial bypass procedure per-
petuates the very problems against which it was designed to protect.
To avoid a constitutional challenge, the Nebraska legislature
should consider redrafting its parental consent law to explicitly in-
clude special consent options for wards of the state.  Additionally,
clear guidance should be provided to judges for use in judicial bypass
proceedings.  These reforms will allow the state to effectively balance
its interests while ensuring that a fundamental, constitutional right is
not denied to an entire class of vulnerable youth.
164. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
